

**THE LIFE AND DEATH OF MOZART:
A FANTASY OF FACT AND FICTION**

Submitted By

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The young man lay in a coma, near death. Outside him, the December cold echoed the state of the dying composer. The wind whistled around corners and into emptiness. Was it an unfinished score? Was it the fragility he had experienced in the last few years? Was it the futility he had endured in trying to reconcile his immense talent with a social world that strove to keep him as a court servant? From outward observation, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart appeared already dead, but inside the mind of this genius, life abounded. Images of all kinds swept him inward...dreams, fantasies, whirling visions and sounds of his entire life began to unfold. Perhaps the physical changes of his body interfered with his inner struggle to make sense of the sensations that were now emerging spontaneously. For a moment, all was still. A sigh escaped his lips. And suddenly, magically it appeared to him, he was aware of a change in the swirling torrent of feeling, and calm descended on his soul. He was in a far-distant and unfamiliar surrounding, in a magnificent performance hall, the likes of which he had never entered nor could ever have imagined. The hall was filled with people and he noticed someone in the front who seemed to hold special significance. The lights had just dimmed...anticipation mounted while musicians prepared for their opening strokes. And then it began. At once he recognized the music: It was *HIS* music, much grander and consuming than he could possibly remember. He saw himself at the podium, but the dress was foreign and at first he didn't believe that it was indeed himself directing this magnificent orchestra as they

transformed black dots into musical language. He was overcome with the awareness that his music had survived the centuries. His gifts remained in the eternal present and somehow here he was...conducting his final "Requiem" himself...somewhere in the future...someplace he did not know, yet knew intimately through this universal mode of connection: *music*. At some point in time, with his body and soul fully engaged in the music under his direction, the story ceased. His energy was drained; yet he was ecstatic, sad, energized, and alone all at once. He felt his legs surrender in the midst of a multitude of cheering and applause, and he faded from consciousness.

As awareness gradually emerged, Mozart found himself in a cozy room with several people circled around him as he lay on a bed of sorts. He was talking to these people as though he knew them, and he felt safe. He was in a dreamy, hypnotic state, recounting events and impressions of his life, and as he did so, his memory altered. Perceptions of his past were at once more objective and compassionate in interpretation. Slowly and dreamily he began to converse.

"My father was everything to me. From an early age I sought to please him, and it was rarely difficult. It was clear that my talents were generous and unique, and it pleased me to be in his emotional caress. Daily I worked for him, learning to read and compose, to play and perform. Daddy was so proud of me; he traveled me from court to court, impressing that society with such a little prodigy. I was to bring fame to him...raise him out of the bourgeoisie level in

which our family existed. Yes, I... Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, was the jewel, the prize, and I never tired of earning it."

Someone in the room placed a damp cloth on his head as he seemed to tire. They looked at one another with questioning glances as they listened to his free-flowing narrative, wondering if he really *was* Mozart, or some delirious man who found his way into the hospital ward off the street. The room was full of psychiatrists, psychologists and interns and all were immensely fascinated at the happenings around them. If this was Mozart, then some trick of fate had landed him in the 20th century. If this was a psychotic patient who had taken on the identity of Mozart, they nevertheless were aware that this patient had much to teach them. One doctor began to speak.

"This patient is in a dream-like state, similar to hypnosis. We will be able to talk to him and he will be able to respond. As we do this, I am hoping that together we will be able to formulate a picture of this man's personality...at times seeking his innermost drives and desires, and at times probing his outward behavior to see if there are connections. Personality is not easy to define, but most professionals agree that the concept encompasses a person's actions, cognitions, emotions and motivations, some of which are "fixed" and some of which are more malleable according to specific situations (Ross, 1992). The construct of personality is designed in order to help us consistently explain human behavior, and according to Monte (1995), asks questions such as (1) Why does a person behave the way he or she does?; (2) Can we expect that this

behavior will be similar across situations?; and (3) How significant are the effects of others on an individual, and would those same effects be experienced similarly by different people?

Psychoanalysis views personality as a fixed and determined mechanism; behavior is the outward manifestation of irrational, unconscious forces comprised of biological and instinctual drives that conflict with social forces (Okun, 1990). The degree of chaos or harmony within Freud's view of the structured mind will reflect the individual personality (Arlow, 1985). Sullivan (1954) argued that personality was irreconcilably intertwined with interpersonal relationships, and that the patterns set forth in early bonding relationships formed a rather enduring pattern of behavior with others. We all know and revere Sigmund Freud for his contributions to the study of human personality and behavior, so let's take a deeper look at his model of the mind. Giovacchini (1977) said,

Psychoanalysis, a depth psychology, views the mind as an entity containing primitive and sophisticated elements, hierarchically ordered. The primitive end of the spectrum has biologically based instincts (known as id) striving for expression against more structured reality-based elements (known as ego) which strive to make instinctual gratification consonant with internalized moral standards (known as superego). (p. 15)

Stemming from his medical background, Freud viewed the mind from a biological framework. He envisioned a fixed and limited amount of psychic

energy that sought homeostasis; energy spent on one task is not available for another, and the notion of energy flowing between instinctual needs is called the dynamic model of the mind (Gabbard, 1994; Ross, 1992). The idea of an unconscious having effects on conscious (higher) levels of the personality is known as a dynamic unconscious, and represents the most fundamental unique hypothesis of psychoanalytic theory (Giovacchini). Conflict arises when too much energy is spent in one place at the expense of another, such as when the harsh superego will not allow enough gratification originating in the id. In addition to the idea of conflict, there is the notion of “deficit”, which is described by Gabbard as a “...weakened or absent psychic structure that prevents a person from feeling whole and secure. As a result, they require inordinate responses from persons in the environment to maintain psychological homeostasis” (p. 4). Freud’s vision of personality placed man in the passive position, maintaining that personality was the consequence of inner reality interacting with outer reality. He often utilized the metaphor of Ananke, the Greek personification of ‘Necessity’...needs, fate, etc. He emphasized that inner and outer reality cannot be changed, but in analysis, one can change one’s *illusions* about reality (Monte, 1995). Personality is the embodiment of the ways in which each individual reconciles the competing forces: inner and outer; biological, psychological and environmental. The fundamental principles that differentiate psychoanalysis from other personality theories can be utilized to understand both the construct of personality and the practice of psychoanalytic therapy. These principles

include the unique value of subjective experience, which is what we will be hearing from our young Mozart; the belief that all motivations are derived from our unconscious; the Oedipus complex; and the belief in psychic determinism (Gabbard). As we work with our patient, we may have the fortune, in addition, to witness transference, countertransference, resistance, and the product of his early childhood experiences upon his adult life."

"Excuse me, doctor, but I have always disagreed with ideas that we are all running around trying to have sexual and aggressive impulses gratified and that all our motivations stem from this energy known as libido. That is like saying that we are nothing more than animals, and that we cannot think or make rational choices on our own. I believe that we have more cognitive powers than that, even if our past experiences were less than adequate. I'm sorry, but I simply cannot agree with you that we will be able to determine Mozart's personality by listening to him emotive his feeling through ramblings and free associations. We will know his personality by what we can observe."

"Yes, but what we can observe about an individual is severely limited, is it not? How will you observe this man's self-concept, his self-image? After all, this is private knowledge of which only he possesses, even if some of it is outside his awareness. When he says he never tired of earning his father's admiration, how would you go about observing that piece of information? How would you know, for example, that his so-called never ending supply of energy used to

please his father was emerging from a sublimated sexual drive, or perhaps as energy tied with aggression utilized to constantly replenish his father's love?"

"And how would *you* know, doctor, if Mozart was just exhibiting what the moderate behaviorists would call a fulfillment theory of personality, in which human behavior is interpreted as nothing more than the styles he or she has learned in order to reduce tension from drives? Perhaps the "emotional caress" of which he spoke is a secondary drive evolved from the primary drive of anxiety, which, according to research among moderate behaviorists, belongs with the other biological drives such as thirst, hunger, sex, curiosity, activity, and pain (Maddi, 1989)."

An intern interrupted the discourse. "Ladies and gentlemen, this is certainly an issue of some magnitude: trying to determine if Mozart's drive to please his father emerged from Oedipal conflicts or secondary rewards. Have you considered the cognitive-behavioral position on behavior and personality? This theory is rapidly gaining respect in this country, yet there are wide misconceptions about its fundamental premises and therapeutic process, including that it ignores early experiences (Gluhosky, 1994). Quite the contrary. This theory recognizes both the magnitude of childhood experiences and the development of vulnerabilities that become associated with negative experience. It also recognizes the need in therapy to recreate similar affect in adulthood if core belief systems, known as schemas, are to be reorganized. Schemas could be thought of as the basis of personality. They are inner beliefs that we hold and

they emerge from our interpersonal relationships with others, especially early experiences, but they do not always accurately reflect the reality of our environment. They also dictate the ways in which we process emotional information, interpret it, recall it, etc. These schemas and constructs have relatively enduring capabilities and the complexities of each individual's pattern of constructs is intertwined with both intellectual and psychological functioning (Messer & Warren, 1990). A faulty schema will be manifested in more than one cognitive or behavioral pattern and conversely, the reparation of one major schema can positively influence more than one cognition or behavior. Dobson and Shaw (1995) say the "...cognitive model of psychopathology predicts that patients who suffer from a given disorder likely have cognitive schemas (often expressed as attitudes towards the self) that serve as vulnerability factors for the negative thinking seen in specific situations" (p. 16). Beck (1993) states that there is a bias in our information processing system that produces dysfunctional behavior, excessive distress, or both. The difference with the psychoanalytic understanding of personality lies in the mechanisms out of which these beliefs develop. For example, psychoanalysis views these cores structures as being unconscious (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Cognitive psychology does not recognize the psychosexual stages of development as a challenge that one meets with greater or lesser degrees of satisfaction. It also does not recognize the structural model of the mind as Freud devised, with certain portions being completely unconscious and others being partially conscious and partially unconscious. It

does not recognize that anxiety results as a conflict between the various wishes and drives as they intersect with a harsh and more realistic outside world, or that defense mechanisms develop in attempts to ignore the rush of anxiety that overwhelms the ego when confronted with such internal dilemmas. They simply view a person as having innate biological drives that must be met, known as primary drives and secondary, non-biological drives that are learned and changeable (Maddi, 1989). And while the psychoanalytic method of restructuring the personality is believed to occur via returning to childhood history and uncovering repressed material through free associations, dreams, fantasies and the like, it is simply not true that cognitive behavioral therapy ignores the value of the historical review.”

The rousing patient began again to speak softly, and the room quieted in anticipation. “You see, in my time, the late 18th century, musician were no more than a servant to the court. Prestige was attained according to how well one satisfied the musical tastes of a given court. Compositions were completed according to both the canons of the time and the desires of the court dignitaries. My father will tell you of the inner agony of the life of a gifted commoner in a society dominated by court aristocrats. He, and myself afterward, held an inescapably subordinate position, so while he attempted at any cost to upgrade his position and his earnings (and he was intellectually superior to most all the court orchestra members), the truth is that he held a secret despicable contempt for the dignitaries who were the key to his future. Without their loyalty, my

father was restricted to positions in lowly courts (Elias, 1993). When my talents as a prodigy became apparent, Father seized the opportunity to lead a life the likes of which had been denied him up to then, and he molded me and shaped me according to some inner design of his. For 20 years, he nurtured me, educated me, financed our numerous travels, and lived a life of fulfillment through me. As it seemed I was destined for Grandiosity, I complied in all ways. Did I know that I represented both the financial and social success to him that he did not have? Did I know that I represented his last and only chance of attaining meaning and fulfillment in his life? That I do not know. All I know now is that I was a child who needed his love and his admiration, and the special gifts I possessed seemed to elicit his utter and complete devotion. In that way our family worked splendidly."

As the patient fell quiet once again, another member of the team of doctors seized the opportunity to enter the dialogue on personality theories. "Our Mozart has mentioned meaning and fulfillment, which are key issues in the existential-humanistic movement, for these words and others represent our view of the person as more subjective, less ruled by mechanistic forces, more driven toward the attainment of personal autonomy. Actually, this view of personality and human nature is quite philosophical and almost atheoretical, focusing exclusively on unprocessed experiences as the data of existence...anxiety, grief, love, despair, creativity, etc. Existentialism is more of a *process of becoming*, of emerging, and under this umbrella, existential and humanist psychologists react

against more classical interpretations of man as static, or as patterned into fixed containers of conflict or chaos. It is this becoming, or coming into being, that is the fundamental structure of human existence. Therefore, the human personality is unique, and each must be considered subjectively and individually.

Furthermore, meaning is whatever the individual uniquely experiences. As stated by Okun (1990), "The existential view of personality comprises the blend of organismic, social and personal givens along with imagined and available possibilities. Human life consists of a series of conscious and unconscious choices from among these possibilities" (p. 215). In the existential view, conflict in personality arises between the individual and the various givens of existence, not as warfare between competing structures of the mind or as faultily learned schemas."

Another doctor asked for clarification. "Just what are these givens, and what evidence has our Mozart given to explain this position thus far?"

"The most comprehensive explanation of existential givens is found in the works of Irvin Yalom (1980). They are death, freedom, meaninglessness, and isolation; awareness of these givens creates anxiety. An existential therapist would address Mozart's understanding that his own life contained the meaning for his father's existence. What happens to Mozart internally, then, if he decides not to continue in that role...will he think he has the power to destroy his father? Would refraining from this role subject him to isolation from his father's

emotional caress; would it even threaten his own non-being? That would be reason for existential guilt and anxiety."

"Yes, but how do we know that it is not also meaningful to Mozart? Maybe his talents and his ability to use them give meaning to his own life. Perhaps this was the expression of his own coming into being, his own fulfillment of potentiality."

"That would be something to explore in his therapy. Only Mozart knows the meaning that he attributes to his alleged function of providing meaning for the meaningless existence of his father. Perhaps he himself doesn't know. Bugental (1978) states that no human can be fully known, not even to himself, because we humans are not empty containers being filled from the outside only. Our feelings, wishes, relationships, our sources of phenomena...all these things act upon an individual and continually alters any notion of sequential patterns or predictions about human behavior. This is the subjective aspect of man, that "...inner, separate and private realm in which we live most genuinely" (p. 7).

Mozart appeared slightly agitated as he began to speak again about his father. "I was the perfect genius son. My father was always present, teaching me and watching my progress, always as though I were a miracle. He was a deeply religious man, and he felt that I had been sent from God as a gift to all mankind. He felt it his duty to share me with all the surrounding countries, that they, too, may understand how God works. Some say that it was this drive of his that led to the many illnesses I contracted on our journeys - smallpox, scarlet

fever and so on, that has brought me to this situation. Here I am on my deathbed, only 35 years old. How could that be? I believed and trusted in him. I did only what he instructed me to do until I was 22 years old. I could have developed in any number of ways because my interests were broad, but it was his decision to lead me into music, and I was ever vigilant to that discipline." At this point he began to cry softly.

"Mozart, what are you feeling at this moment?"

"I am aware of some inner anguish that I didn't know before now. I am wondering if he had the right to determine the path of my life in such influential and directive manners. I was not aware of this angry and rebellious feeling until this moment. And yet I behaved in ways that expressed that anger. For so long I had been denied self-sufficiency and all initiative. When I was 22 years old, I made a decision to break myself from his paternal hold on me, and I did many foolish things at that time. He tried to protest, but I fled even further from his psychological dominion over me. I see now that he was frightened and utterly astonished that his son's character had changed so drastically, and yet unsuspecting that he himself had laid the foundation for my unrealistic and irrational response (Einstein, 1945). He wrote me a letter saying how unhappy he was with the changes he saw in me. He told me how I had been so obedient and serious as a boy and now I was impulsive and hot-tempered (Einstein). Perhaps I didn't know the sacrifice I had been making of my 'self' in order to please him."

The doctor of psychoanalysis took the moment of silence to address his colleagues. "I believe that Mozart is uncovering repressed material from his unconscious. This is one of the characteristics of psychoanalytic thinking, that some material in the id is transformed into preconscious material, which is part of the ego. The ego pushes back certain fragments of the contents, and is said to be repressed (Freud, 1938/1949). Freud said that repression is an activity designed to make an impulse inoperative; in this case it is possible that Mozart repressed aggressive urges toward his father because of the dominance that was conducted under the guise of religious and personal wish fulfillments. He further described repression as a preliminary phase of condemnation, a place between flight and condemnation. It is quite possible that repression serves to satisfy an instinct. Freud stated, "...in every instance such a satisfaction is pleasurable in itself, but is irreconcilable with other claims and purposes; it therefore causes pleasure in one part of the mind and pain in another. We see then that it is a condition of repression that the element of avoiding pain shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure of gratification" (Freud, 1973, p. 111). Fromm-Reichmann (1950) has elaborated on the anxiety-controlling mechanism utilized in repression. She might have described Mozart's unrecognized aggression as a response to an experience that aroused too much anxiety for him to integrate, and that material thus became dissociated from conscious thought. Man's existence depends "...on the successful dissociations, repressions and processes of selective inattention for the mastery of his

psychobiological existence. It is the surplus of painful and anxiety-arousing emotional experience that creates psychopathological problems when barred from awareness" (Fromm-Reichmann, p. 81).

"The cognitive-behavioral view would interpret Mozart's behavioral response at age 22 in a different light. For example, we would possibly claim that Mozart had previously been subjugating his own needs to those of others (Persons, 1993). Rather than reasoning that his aggression had been repressed, we would more likely say that he had subjugated his needs to those of his father, possibly due to implied if not stated "family rules" or "injunctions" (Goulding & Goulding, 1979). He was faced with a dilemma on two levels: overt difficulties and underlying mechanisms. Persons states that underlying mechanisms are dysfunctional attitudes or beliefs about the self, others and the world that are so well learned that the individual has difficulty in identifying them as faulty. He had learned that being good, cooperative, serious about his work, and productive had rewarded him generously by his father. These underlying mechanisms, in interaction with life events, actually caused and maintained Mozart's schema of himself in relation to his father. The foolish behavior of which he speaks is his attempt at integrating a different schema with the old one.

"We must not overlook the issue of responsibility that is apparent from his words. Responsibility for Mozart's anguish has been partially aimed at his father. The existentialist Sartre (1956) states that responsibility is the recognition of being the incontestable author of an event or object. According to Frankl

(1959), responsibility is the very essence of human existence. In therapy, I would first explore his negation of responsibility by asserting that his father had solely decided his fate. Then we would discuss at length the anxiety that was aroused when he *did* break from his father (in my mind the responsible act) for the purpose of fulfilling some uncertain and as yet unrecognized potential. In existential language, the anxiety that accompanies this type of act is aroused due to the direct association with the idea of nonbeing. Tillich (1952) has spoken of the difficulty in comprehending nonbeing, but in relation to anxiety he states, "...anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing...the awareness that nonbeing is a part of one's own being" (p. 35). Perhaps this interpretation of one's responsibility as eliciting anxiety around nonbeing helps us picture Mozart's internal struggle around separation and the isolation it possibly engendered, for both son and father."

Mozart began again. "The break with my father came later than for most people. The nature of our attachment was unusual, due to my talents and his visions for me. The only independence I knew was in the realm of music-making and composing. I had not been taught the ways of the external world. I couldn't manage money. I knew little about the professional management of persons with whom I came into contact (Elias, 1993). In some ways, I was still a mere child, unadapted to adult life. And yet I can see that the deliberate break with my father revealed a grown-up need for independence. I think back now on his attempts to mold me according to rules of aristocratic society. He wanted me not

only to compose according to court canon, but also to bow humbly before them, to acquire mannerisms and behaviors consistent with court society. But I was, at the core, unable to gratify Father's wishes, for he had also taught me that I was special and I knew that my ability far surpassed any of the court aristocrats or musicians. And I was not willing to accept that what came naturally to most court nobles of the time was a condescension, and treatment near to humiliation, to any bourgeoisie citizen. I slowly became aware of the unfair arrangement of the human condition, that social status is all-powerful. I decided not to continue begging, as it were, for court positions. Many times I came close in my imagination. Every time a work of art was received with enthusiasm, I was sure I would be offered the highest position of Kapellmeister. Then I would go into a manic state of emotional ecstasy. Time and again it never happened. Until I accepted and even decided to earn a living my way - as a freelance artist, which of course wasn't done then. No one made a living through commissioned operas or promise of published works. I thought myself to be special. My genius would become clear. I would be saved from debts and misfortunes...Do you know what it's like to be treated like a servant, to fight for an inch of dignity, to be unrecognized as superior, to be treated unfairly due to social position?"

The doctors in the room had become mesmerized at the outpour of emotion from Mozart's flowing stream of consciousness. They had been witness to childhood lessons, attempts at manhood, limitations incurred from his childhood, agonizing thoughts at reconciling the competing facts of his existence.

They hardly knew where to take up the discussion amongst themselves...should they focus on his internal, subjective life? Should they try to unravel the defense mechanisms they witnessed at work in their patient? Finally, one doctor spoke.

“Let’s work backward from the wealth of material Mozart just presented us. He spoke of being sure that he was special, and that he would be rescued from the norms and traditions of his time because of who he was. This beautifully depicts the defense mechanisms in existential psychology. Yalom (1980) called these defenses *specialness* and *ultimate rescuer*, utilized to ward off anxiety organized around the realization of nonbeing. The application of these defenses absolves one from the work of facing the realities of existence. Another characteristic of existential thinking that came to mind during Mozart’s most recent monologue was that of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence. I sensed in our poor fellow a profound conflict between living the life desired by his father which allowed only the musician aspect of his son to be cultivated. In fact there are other facts that Mozart was attempting to actualize, which might have provided him with a fuller, more authentic existence. The activity designed to assimilate court manners and etiquette was not compatible with an inner view of himself as authentic. His need to be valued for who he was, and his need to go free-lance in order to remove restrictions on his compositions were also efforts at moving in authentic directions. Both of these collided with what his father wanted for him. The striving for authenticity is of paramount importance, because the strive itself represents the uniqueness, the

exclusiveness and the vitality of the individual, as a movement *toward* something. Other forms of psychotherapy might use the word autonomous, or wholeness, or self-actualizing. By contrast, the inauthentic state of the individual is the state of conformity, relinquishment of one's unique potentials, and the passive-reactive states of being (Yalom). R.D. Laing has stated that when one is striving to produce a false front or self is when disordered behavior will become apparent, and also that "...the most important immediate result of the establishment of a false self is that the individual's acts are no longer self-expressions" (Monte, 1995, p. 438). In therapy, the goal would always be toward increased authenticity. Authenticity aims toward the future and fulfillment, and this reflects the idea of becoming, or coming into being. Inauthenticity keeps us merely in the present, as it is more static. In conjunction with these ideas is the state of existential guilt which is created when one fails to pursue actively his or her authenticity and possibilities."

"I can appreciate the philosophical aspects of man because it seems to classify all of us as desirous of a more fulfilling life, but in therapy, how would focusing on this aspect of man make him or her actually function any better? If we were to focus on only the here-and-now of Mozart, would we not be robbed of much crucial elaboration on the person of the man himself? Dwelling in the here-and-now deprives us of the understanding of the struggle Mozart experienced between maintaining the "emotional caress" of his father, and written about this topic. She states,

Limited understanding of cause and effect, a tendency to think concretely and egocentrically, and a very limited capacity to understand how others work psychologically, make a child prone to distorted conclusions about the self and about others which persist as the core of our basic premises for adult life. To try to change only within the context of the here and now necessitates denial of the existence not only of the conclusions of childhood but of the whole rational superstructure tailored to fit them which a person develops over a lifetime. (p. 36)

This is the necessity of reviewing the past, because the present is real only in relation to this past.”

“For now, let us continue our discussion of existential ideas in relationship to Mozart. The separations he made both from his father and from the court position that kept him tied to inauthenticity would be understood as moving toward freedom, or toward exercising the freedom to choose. This action propels one toward further awareness of our existential concerns. However, it, too, arouses anxiety, which apparently is a universal experience, as well as the urge to alleviate same anxiety. We would say, however, that attempting to alleviate anxiety is part of being inauthentic. In existential terms, anxiety, if not modified by an object, “...is always the anxiety of ultimate nonbeing” (Tillich, 1952, p. 38). He says further that it expresses itself as helplessness and loss of direction, and therefore participation, struggle and love with respect to anxiety is impossible. Allowing the anxiety to be felt and included as part of the gift of being alive

leads to authenticity. The authentic state, then, means that we view ourselves as creatures who have freedom to interpret and assign meaning to our lives. There is an understanding that when a choice is made, the alternative is relinquished. If we were to engage Mozart in an existential-humanistic course of therapy, he would be encouraged to see himself as the creator of all meaning in his life. The thrust would be to have him seek to become aware of, and to a lesser extent to express in words, how he identifies his world. Therapy moves forward to the extent that he can be helped to look "...soberly and deeply into his...own inner experiencing, to express emotions, strivings and apprehensions, to be open to changing perceptions, and to modify or relinquish self-defeating self and world percepts" (Bugental & McBeath, 1995, p. 114). The focus would be on uncovering the unique potentials of Mozart, the raising of his "self"-consciousness and the ability to accept death as part of fate at some point in the future. As May (1983) states, "Death is...the one fact which is not relative but absolute, and my awareness of this gives my existence and what I do each hour an absolute quality" (p. 107). At this point in our experience with our patient, it is unclear whether or not he has acknowledged the finiteness of his existence, unclear whether he has experienced himself as a whole person who is continuing to become who he is. In essence, this is the view of human motivation."

"But that view does not account for objective reality in any way. It does not account for social and cultural determinants as part of motivation. Nor does it account for Freud's view that biological drives are the catalyst for all human

motivation, which also underestimates the extent to which we are culturally and historically conditioned (Westen, 1990). “

“Let’s return to the assumption of motivation, because I think we would all agree that it is a fundamental expression of personality. Bandura (1989) would say that motivation results from the interaction of behavior, cognitions, and environment, which, by the way, departs from earlier behavioral beliefs that motivation is acquired from environmental influences only, that is, from mechanical agency. Freud would have maintained that motivation is biologically derived from the instincts, emphasizing aggressive and sexual needs that press for expression and create conflict, and out of which all other motives ultimately flow (Messer & Warren, 1990). A psychological motive, such as suppression will also require an expenditure of energy. According to Westen (1990), “...the motive, if fueled by enough force, will likely be expressed by conversion to another form no longer under conscious control, such as a symptom, a dream, a joke, a slip of the tongue, behavior, ideology – the possible outlets are boundless” (p. 23). Freud (1973) indicated also that an instinct never acts as a momentary impact, but always as a constant force, and further that id impulses were capable of activities far removed from the source. He would possibly call Mozart’s musical life an example of sublimation. Ross (1992) stated that Freud viewed all cultural endeavors or achievements as the consequence of sublimated primitive impulses. A humanist such as Carl Rogers believes that self-actualization is the highest motivation for organizing the experiences of

human beings (Okun, 1990), and further, that the tendency toward self-actualization is innate. Does everyone recognize the difference between the understanding of motivation and human agency in these three theories?"

"I particularly see variation in the psychoanalytic view. Both cognitive-behavioral and existential-humanist theories value the aspect of *self* as determinant, along with other environmental and social effects, whereas the Freudian view would emphasize the unconscious need for *expression of the drives* as the force determining motivation. In the first case, we are seen as active determinants, and in the latter as passive victim-recipients of competing biological and psychological drives."

The room became suddenly still. They all, even Mozart, seemed to be struggling to digest the plethora of insight emerging from the discussions. One member noticed that their patient seemed fully coherent and possibly calmer than before. She approached Mozart with the following, "Would you describe for me the experiences you encountered upon leaving the domain of your father?"

"Yes, well...as I said, I was still a child for all practical purposes. I lived in a time when my social position dictated my very existence. Father complained that I was naïve when it came to human relationships, that I spent money I did not have, and when I did have money, I squandered it on the wrong people for the wrong reasons. I really was a person torn between two identities, both of which reflected my father's influence. Musically I was a genius, brought to

fruition through the sacrifices and determination of my father. People such as myself often do not fit in with normal people. Some say genius has nothing to do with universal rules or norms, that a genius is simply a medium who is both blessed and cursed. They say my work of art is oriented completely inward, not toward the universe external, and is primitive, subconscious, private (Stafford, 1991)."

"What is your feeling in response to this supposition?"

"I don't know...there must be truth in this. I composed for reasons that I am not fully aware as yet. There was pleasure in the act: as a child I earned my father's attention; as I grew it gave me a voice against the anger I felt toward the lengthy domination of my father. It seemed to protect me somehow from some fear I had of him and at the same time gave me a sense of the sublime. It was easier for me to compose than to not compose (Elias, 1993). After my departure from Father, there were many letters from him that bothered and disturbed me. He did not want me to get married. He blamed me for my mother's death that occurred while she was with me in Paris (Elias; Solomon, 1990). My mother..... now there's something again. She was a warm and loving mum and she moderated the demands made by Father. At this moment I feel such sadness and loss, and also guilt for not saving her. Maybe part of my work is to be assured of her love, to win her over, even in death. I wonder what she would have thought of Constanze, my wife. Father did not like her, and he did not

want me involved with her or any woman. In the year I left him, he wrote me a letter full of venom at the idea of marriage He said to me,

Now it depends solely on your good sense and your way of life whether you die as an ordinary musician, utterly forgotten by the world, or as a famous Kapellmeister, of whom posterity will read – whether, captured by some woman, you die bedded on straw in an attic full of starving children, or whether, after a Christian life spent in contentment, honour and renown, you leave this world with your family well provided for and your name respected by all". (Mozart, 1778/1966)

"Tell me how you felt about this letter."

"Now I see that it is a tragic explanation of his need to maintain his lifelong paternal dominance (Solomon, 1990). My struggles to become independent of him were never completely resolved, although I attempted to retain his affections. I wrote back to him these words: 'Those days when, standing on a chair, I used to sing to you...and finish by kissing you on the tip of your nose, are gone indeed; but do I honour, love and obey you any less on that account?' It is a dreadful thing he did, this control he exerted through manipulation of my innermost feelings of care, gratitude and guilt. He felt that he was being punished for my conduct (Solomon). But there is something else that is tormenting me as well. It was about this time that Father seemed to demonstrate a certain impatience with my success, maybe a little jealousy. Maybe even competition, as if I had suddenly become too good and that I had

surpassed him. He began to withhold the always longed-for praise that I needed from him in response to a new composition, and now I am aware of the pain and distress that this realization brings to me.”

Mozart drifted away with his thoughts. The room was filled with his distress, his heartache, and the bittersweet truth that all of us carry the burden of being someone’s child long into adulthood. Nevertheless, they noticed that his hurt, anger, guilt and frustration seemed to be melting in the direction of something different, something more like acceptance or forgiveness.

“This might be a good time to introduce Freud’s concept of the Oedipus complex into our discussion; I believe there are elements at work here that might help us understand Mozart’s underlying mechanism of motivation and how it participated with his natural genius. Freud (1938/1949) himself said of this phenomenon that “...if psychoanalysis could boast of no other achievement than the discovery of the repressed Oedipus complex, that alone would give it a claim to be counted among the precious new acquisitions of mankind” (p. 97). His ideas are definitely a point of controversy among a wide array of intellectuals, because it highlights his emphasis on the sexual nature and development of children. We remember that the name is borrowed from the legend of King Oedipus, who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother, fulfilling the oracle at Delphi. From a literary standpoint, one first questions the correlation to psychoanalysis – after all, he did not *know* it was his father. Again, Freud responds in this way: “The ignorance of Oedipus is a legitimate

representation of the unconsciousness into which, for adults, the whole experience has fallen; and the doom of the oracle, which makes or should make the hero innocent, is a recognition of the inevitability of the fate which has condemned every son to live through the Oedipus complex" (Freud, 1939/1949, pp. 95-96). Also, let us be reminded of the corollaries of this complex.

Supposedly the male child has sexual fantasies that involve his mother, but fearing the anger of his father (manifest as a fear of castration), the child must resolve this conflict, and usually does so by identifying with his father, the perceived aggressor. According to Freud (1924/1989), "The whole process has, on the one hand, preserved the genital organ - has averted the danger of its loss - and, on the other, has paralysed it - has removed its function." Concomitant with the resolution is a repression of the anxiety tied up with this particular fear of castration. Mozart used the word *competition*, which exactly is the basis of the Oedipus complex....competition for the mother/wife. How do you think we could analyze Mozart's dependence on his father's love and emotional caress in light of the Oedipal complex?"

"Perhaps we would interpret the events as fear of his father and castration due to longings for the mother, resulting in over-identification with a rewarding father, which served to relieve anxiety around the fears of castration. With the fears having been repressed as a child, the act of his father's withholding the admiration that had previously alleviated the anxiety functioned as a catalyst for stirring up the repressed material again in adulthood."

“I think this indeed is possible. Freud (1924/1989) told us that if the process is merely repressed, and not completely resolved, the complex “...persists in an unconscious state in the id and will later manifest its pathogenic effect” (p. 624). The pathogenic effect in this case is the continued anxiety around losing his father’s support and admiration, and the perception that his father was continuing to engage in competitive struggles with his son. Neither of the other two models of personality theory would be able to account for this developmental process that started in childhood, and is still maintaining power in adulthood. That is one of the beauties and strengths of this method over the other two major personality theories. Psychoanalysis is the only theory that has shown us a conception of how we behave in adulthood because of actual events intertwined with fantasy and mental representations originating in childhood. Freud has given us a model of development as to how actual representations formulate themselves within each of us, how these beliefs develop in the first place, why it is that we are so resistant to change, how it is that distortions and neuroses can develop, etc. The other theories give us a model of adult-type thinking and cognition and how these can become faulty. The critical formative years have been ignored in the other two, and it is precisely these years in which our opinions, our self-evaluations, our interactions with others, our beliefs about self and others, in short, our *self* is being determined. And we know from lessons in history and science that data alone will not change our cherished beliefs. As Meichenbaum (1995) concluded, we humans have the penchant to distort and to

attend selectively to experience in order to make it fit our memories and expectations. The cognitive-behaviorists may have provided us with a different way to conceptualize learning, and perhaps even an effective way to conceptualize the therapeutic process, but it has not yet given us a model of how their ideas develop in infancy and childhood.”

“That simply is not true. The cognitive-behaviorists identify development as a progressive differentiation of constructs (Messer & Warren, 1990). They view early life as being comprised of nuclear scenes (Carlson, 1981) and the issue of schemas is also viewed developmentally. The notion of interpersonal schemas is very similar to Stern’s (1985) interpersonal subjective theories of personality. All of these are conceptualized in terms of increasing developmental differentiation and sophistication (Messer & Warren).”

“That’s all well and good, but the psychoanalytic position provides us with a richer paradigm from which to conceptualize human development. Cognitive therapy has had a certain success in areas such as depression, anxiety disorders, bulimia, conduct disorder in children, schizophrenia, etc. (Beck, 1993; Meichenbaum, 1995). There is nothing wrong with this list, but how would you propose that it could give us a paradigm to deal with Mozart’s struggles with his father, with his anguish over conflicting messages from him, and with acceptance of the fact that he is dying? These are issues that originate from the core of his existence, from earliest infancy onward.”

“We would have him reframe his feelings of sadness, despair and depression in a cognitive format. We would have him identify consciously those feelings and thoughts and beliefs that he holds – for example, that his father loved him only as long as he was under his direct control, or as long as he represented the possibility of bringing acclaim to his father – and guide him into an understanding that these comprise part of his *internal dialogue* (Meichenbaum, 1995). We would teach him that these cognitions developed into a faulty or limited schema of himself that his loveableness was bounded by his father’s definitions. Then we would help him challenge these cognitive structures and replace irrational material with more realistic evaluations, meanwhile educating him that he has constructed a reality based on partially erroneous facts, and therefore he will begin to reconstruct a future with a more adaptive modus operandi. It is not his depression or sadness that is faulty, but what he says about it to himself and others. “

“How is that any different from the existential idea of assigning meaning to an otherwise meaningless world?”

“First of all, there is a philosophical cleavage. A cognitive-behavioral orientation has less emphasis on the therapist and the therapeutic system, while an existential position focuses on the potency of the client as having the power to bring about change (Bugental & McBeath, 1995). Another significant point of contrast is an “...unwillingness to accept symptom alleviation or other quasi-objective change as a sufficient outcome for treatment” (Bugental & McBeath,

p. 120). The nature of existential therapy is such that it requires a lengthy commitment and investment of time, personal searching, and financial obligation. In our current managed care situation, this is interpreted as a negative, but how else can a client fully experience himself or herself as more multi-dimensional, as capable of exploring and finding meaning and value in existence? There is a spiritual element in existential psychotherapy that elicits resistance as the proximity to existential givens is approached; this resistance is evidenced both in clients and from other more cognitive forms of therapy.

Second, the existentialists have not organized a formal theory of childhood and adolescent development (Okun, 1990), but it does state that an infant arrives in a sea of possibilities, and in order to become a human person, "...to have some self-direction; to live its life it must reduce the range of possibilities. Forming a life is much more a process of eliminating than of adding on" (Bugental & McBeath, p. 112). In addition, Yalom (1980) perceived the defenses of specialness and ultimate rescuer as originating between the ages of two and five, and as being evident in adolescence through talk and behavior around the uncertainty of death. As in other models of personality, however, certain evolutions of thinking about and interpreting man's existence are shifting and expanding the original paradigms. For example, Stolorow & Atwood (1992) and Assagioli (1965) have begun to view the existential position of man's isolation as a distortion of our truer nature, which they feel to be intersubjective. As such, there is a certain synthesis between existentialism and current psychoanalytic

views such as those of Stolorow and Gill (1994). If you consider in addition the cognitive element of constructivism as one in which reality is determined by the experiencer, I think we will see more interface and less distinction between theories of personality and therapy in the future. At the present, however, the underpinnings of existential-humanistic therapies are philosophical, whereas constructivism as a development in cognitive-behavioral science is more theoretical."

"Are you saying that psychoanalysis will eventually relinquish its primal emphasis on the biological drives and intrapsychic conflicts of man and incorporate more of the spiritual and intersubjective aspects of man's existence?"

"I'm saying that there are already moves to at least not *exclude* these other dimensions. The cognitive-behavioral position is still more objective at this point, and the focus on belief systems and schemas, and the changing of these systems, certainly has less orientation toward the spiritual aspect of existence. As Okun (1990) states, "This model, while useful, effective and thoroughly pragmatic, lacks the richness that would come from consideration of the full dimensions of human experience" (p. 190).

At this point, Mozart entered the discussion. "Wonderful people, I am fully engaged in this moment, and fully intrigued by the ideas I hear. All these theories make sense to me and I wonder how I can make use of them in the little time I have left."

“What has been helpful to you, friend? What can alleviate your sadness, or help make sense of your life?”

“For one, I can compose, if you will, a narrative of my life, using words tonight instead of music. Words and ideas that I have heard discussed become a story in my mind, and I see value in all these theories. I could begin my story by using Freud’s theory, that in childhood I passed rather unsuccessfully through the Oedipal period. Perhaps I can even accept that children are more vulnerable to introjections of parents, more vulnerable to forces in heredity and environment, less active in formulating realistic assessments of self and world, and powerless in the face of the dramatic forces in the unconscious. In short, I am a rather passive instrument of my unconscious that is seeking gratification. I can see that id drives of sex and aggression were possibly sublimated through my music and perhaps repressed when anxiety overwhelmed my ego.”

“Do you understand how the Oedipus complex is the precursor to the superego? You could call this your conscience, Mozart, for the sake of understanding it more clearly, for its job is to make you feel guilty. Freud (1932/1964) says, “The superego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality, and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the superego” (p. 61). So you must understand that conflicts experienced internally around the ages of 4 and 5 resulted in the development of your superego. Even if the upbringing were completely mild,

the normal person nevertheless develops the strict superego, forming the image of the "ideal" ego to which you will strive to achieve."

"Then I spent 22 years struggling to achieve this ideal which had been cemented early in my life? Why did I loosen the ideal upon breaking with my father?"

"Partly because the way your father appeared to you at age 22 was not as idealized as the father of the Oedipus era, nor as feared. Yet there was always a part of you that clung to the earlier ego ideal, and you can witness that in yourself by noting how you continued to need his approval of your compositions."

"This feels like a deeper layer of analysis than the theory that I developed faulty cognitions that then influenced my emotions and behavior. If I have learned correctly, then identifying my early adult life as a series of learned behaviors and irrational beliefs might possibly only afford me a superficial level of insight and a temporary relief from symptoms?"

"That is definitely what psychoanalysis would maintain. The jury is still out on this one, my friend, because research is needed that would more fully contradict this opinion."

"I am baffled. How is it that this century has learned to do research on the complex human being?"

"My dear Mozart, you have no idea of the magnitude of disputes on this issue in this century! Our esteemed colleague Yalom (1980) says, "Woe to the

researcher who has to measure the important factors, such as ability to love or care for another, zest in life, purposefulness, generosity, exuberance, autonomy, spontaneity, humor, courage, or engagement in life" (p. 24). We have those who believe that there is a fixed reality that is knowable, and they would be those in accordance with a rational cognitive position; and we have those who assume that there is no such thing as an external and permanent reality, and these would be the people who adhere to a constructivist position (Dobson & Shaw, 1995).

We have those who continue to model human science research after natural science research, and we have those who unequivocally state that human science is hermeneutic (Gill, 1994). Gill states that the problem definition in the scientific method is that of *data*, which brings us back to: what can be known, studied, observed, what constitutes fact and reality. Is *fact* only that dimension which is in no way relative to the observer? Your mother died when she was with you in Paris...that is a fact. But the meaning of that fact would be experienced uniquely by you, and since that would be the issue for you in therapy, why would it be important to research the fact alone? "

"By the way, some persons, such as Grunbaum (1984) argue that clinical data is not scientifically valid, but I would like to point out that there has actually been a great deal of research in areas that confirm some of the major psychoanalytic hypotheses and are not clinically derived. Some of these studies interface with various aspects of cognitive psychology, including the recognition that subliminal stimuli influence affect and subsequent cognition (Dixon, 1979,

1981; Poetzl, 1917/1960) and documentation of the existence of unconscious affective process (Greenberg & Saffran, 1987; Westen, 1985). From the perspective of psychoanalysis, this type of research serves to validate one of the fundamental premises of our theory: that the unconscious has direct influence on motivation. Many other tenets of psychoanalysis have been studied with convincing results, such as defense mechanisms (Vaillant, 1977); transference (Luborsky et al., 1986); and the hierarchical primacy of neurological functioning (Cooper, 1984; Hadley, 1983; Miller, 1986; Reiser, 1984). As Westen (1985) concludes, "The pervasive assumption that psychoanalysis is entirely without empirical grounding is simply wrong" (p. 51).

"What is this thing called transference that you mention?"

"Mozart, the transference process is an important domain of psychoanalysis in which the misdirected placement of thoughts, feelings, wishes and interactional patterns from childhood relationships are experienced again through the therapist and also with others (Freud, 1912/1958). Transference represents the way in which you will typically respond emotionally to your therapist: whether you unknowingly elicit situations that will repeat patterns from your past, whether you will attach or invest in the therapeutic relationship, whether you will feel aggressive, hostile, or even infantile. Giovacchini (1977) said, "The ability of the patient to distinguish between this childish orientation and the actual analytic relationship become the main therapeutic vehicle...as well as the chief obstacle to cure" (pp. 34-35). For instance, how would you

describe or characterize the dominant feelings you have experienced with me tonight?"

"I feel like I want you to like me and to be interested in me and my work. In fact, in my dream, *you* were the one on the front row applauding me before I collapsed, and I felt exhilaration at your approval of my performance. I was momentarily aware that I wished for you to come take care of me. But you wouldn't come assist me...you left me there alone."

"Friend, had we been in therapy, we would explore this dream and your desires and wishes around the figure from whom you wanted attention. We would determine if these desires were similar to what you desired from your father, and whether your perception that I was unable to comfort you in the way you needed was a projection of uneasiness or anxiety about both having those feelings and having them rejected."

Mozart looked startled. He stopped, and then nodded with awareness. "AAAHHHH...I was wanting your emotional caress."

The room was silent and still; solemnly they allowed Mozart the space to process the full meaning of the short interaction. For a moment they knew they had witnessed and participated in a flickering of awareness and recognition in their patient, and they marveled in the regalness of the therapeutic encounter. The moment of silence prompted the memory of one of the intern's favorite passages, and he shared it with the group.

This relationship is not immediately comparable to any other in life.

It is a friendship; it is a love affair; it is a partnership; it is a blood bond; it is a duel; it is all of these and none of them and yet something more. It is a *therapeutic alliance*, a bond between what is best and most dedicated in the therapist and what is most health-seeking and courageous in the client. It will have many other elements in it at various points, but this is its essence. Each partner to the alliance will fall short at times of being all that it demands and yet it must endure. (Bugental, 1978, p. 72)

As Mozart remained quiet, the conversation again turned to didactic concerns. "I would like all of you to read Merton Gill's (1994) *Psychoanalysis in Transition* because he addresses the issues that seem to be underway in psychoanalysis. Freud (1932/1964) maintained that psychoanalysis was unequivocally a natural science, but there are concerns now that it is rather a constructivist and a hermeneutic science, and that these together constitute an oxymoron. Gill, however, sees all science as constructivist, because "the contribution of the observer can never be reduced to zero" (p. 5). As applied to psychoanalytic treatment, the analyst will never be a blank screen for the patient, and to believe this is to commit a monumental error. The analyst is in the position of interpreting both verbal and nonverbal meaning, and facts turn out to be what analyst and analysand together agree that they are; further, the facts will change as therapy progresses. In this way, psychoanalysis is a discipline and not

a natural science (Schafer, 1983). In my view, this postmodern interpretation of psychoanalysis is much more profitable, because I can preserve my belief in the impact of the unconscious on the conscious (as well as many other theoretical underpinnings). In addition, it allows me to vary the overarching premise of the natural science view of man as object, as well as the attitude of myself as analyst. This *attitude* is what Westen (1990) and others have called mutual storymaking, "...in which patient and analyst construct a compelling narrative that provides the patient with an integrated view of his or her history and helps explain seemingly inexplicable aspects of the patient's life" (p. 35). Unfortunately, this view is denounced by many classical analysts, who would maintain that the constructivist position ignores the factual assertions that Freud made concerning human mental life."

"Doesn't the psychoanalytic model ignore gender and cultural issues? Doesn't it perpetuate the fallacious thinking that males are superior, that women suffer from a weak superego and moral structure because of the difference in the Oedipal resolution? Doesn't classical analysis view the model of male mental health in a different light than female mental health? In fact, wouldn't you say that Freud did not offer us any positive value except that we be passive, dependent and emotional? (Okun, 1990). What did he have to offer to any group other than white males? Does he actually generalize to any era other than the one in which he lived and studied? In addition, he gives us only a

developmental picture of the infant and young adolescent – does that mean that he felt we were essentially established at the end of the genital stage?”

“Considering all that he did give us, perhaps we can forgive him, and even give him the benefit of the doubt, that if he had lived another 50 years, he would have been able to formulate a theory of women that would be compatible with more contemporary feminist thinking, and perhaps he would be able to address the changes that have occurred in our world regarding cultural and ethnic diversity. Please don’t dismiss psychoanalysis on the basis of its weaknesses with regard to women. After all, look at the incredible female thinkers and writers that were promulgated, possibly out of sheer frustration of Freud’s thinking, and think of all the ideas that flowered in reaction to so many of his ideas that were then so new. Out of the primordial rudiments of the intellectual genius of Sigmund Freud grew new extensions of his thinking, like the object relations school, ego and self psychology. Who else has given us so much to think about?”

“One of the alleged weaknesses of the existential-humanistic interpretation of personality is the lack of clearly empirical evidence supporting the major ideas of denial of death. What has been accomplished in the area that has close analogous possibilities is laboratory research on cognitive styles and personality research on locus of control (Yalom, 1980). The cognitive styles of *field-dependent* or *field-independent* personality have been linked to the defense mechanisms of ultimate rescuer and personal specialness, respectively. The

personality studies of internal or external locus of control are associated with these other dimensions as well. Let's take an example of the ultimate rescuer/field dependent/external locus of control person in the extreme. Research in this area is generally of a perceptive nature that determines that these individuals are not able to separate themselves from the position of the surrounding field. They will tend to look outside of themselves for answers, support and guidance; and they tend to be suggestible, passive and to feel inadequate, anxious, hostile, confused and depressed (Yalom). Does this sound like our friend Mozart? Yalom states, "The existential position emphasizes a different kind of basic conflict; neither a conflict with suppressed instinctual strivings nor one with internalized significant adults, but instead a conflict that flows from the individual's confrontation with the givens of existence. This existential dynamic conflict stems from the dilemma of a meaning-seeking creature who is thrown into a universe that has no meaning" (pp. 8-9).

"This brings me to a point involving the possibility of psychology being an empirical science. Tonight we have discussed the major theories of personality, some of which have more research support than others. We have pretty much dismissed the idea that there is one *right* theory that explains all human behavior and emotion. After all, most theories are derived from the private life experience and development of individual people. Most theories are basically untestable, make few predictions, generate few laboratory studies, and frequently lead to disputes around opinion rather than fact (Monte, 1995). It

could be possible that we do not even need psychology to be a science; perhaps it is our duty to study enduring human themes of existence, human nature, and how it is that as psychologists we can facilitate individuals to know who they are in this arena.”

During this discussion, they had not noticed that their patient seemed to have lapsed in energy. He now lay motionless yet he was breathing faintly. He spoke almost inaudibly. “I feel I am near the end. I have more to complete before I go.”

“Dear Mozart, we have been discussing Yalom’s assertion that all of us have a death anxiety, and the extent to which this anxiety pervades our innermost self tells us much about ourselves. At this pivotal moment, let us forget about science and research, and concentrate on you and your inner life.”

“I had a meaning that directed my life. Of that I am sure. Having been in the presence of awareness this evening, and having experienced again the lack of responsibility that I acknowledged as I was living my life does not change the meaning and value that I feel for myself now. It has only brought me to a deeper understanding of myself in all my complexities, fears, desires and needs. My father loved me...I can believe that now, and I know that many of his actions toward me in the last few years expressed his own disappointments as he attempted to continue loving me in the way that he had when I was a child. The last three years of my life have been plagued with loneliness and despair. Money worries and debts increased. No one understands my compositions

anymore, and I attempted to become a free-lance artist in a time that was not ready for me. I compose only for me now, utilizing the pull of my full imagination. I have drunk too much and have wasted my time in lowly company. I have been utterly incompetent in professional relationships, completely lacking in tact and worldly wisdom. This is a picture of me. Maybe the sheltered childhood contributed to this part of my inadequacies in adult life, or maybe I have lived in denial of my fears surrounding nonbeing. But this is what I have and what I don't have. These were choices I made and I must fully BE this person that I am. The most authentic self I have is the one at this moment. I am grateful that I have known what it is like to have experienced open honesty, and I approach my death without regret. Whatever has happened in this most precious and unparalleled encounter has enriched my life in indescribable ways. You have embraced and caressed me like a song, and the song is now sung...."

The dream was over. The chaos subsided. He had renewed his life, allowing his death to feel complete. Outside, the December cold mimicked the state of the dead composer. The wind whistled around corners and into emptiness, while his music lived on in fullness.

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